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Abstract. There is a scalability gap between probabilistic and non-
probabilistic verification. Probabilistic model checking tools are based
either on explicit engines or on (Multi-Terminal) Binary Decision Dia-
grams. These structures are complemented in areas of non-probabilistic
verification by more scalable techniques, such as IC3. We present a sym-
bolic probabilistic model checking algorithm based on IC3-like incremen-
tal construction of inductive clauses to partition the state space, inter-
leaved with incremental construction of a system of linear inequalities.
This paper compares our implementation to standard quantitative verifi-
cation alternatives: our experiments show that our algorithm is a step to
more scalable symbolic verification of rare events in finite-state Markov
chains.
1 Introduction
Probabilistic model checking is a formal verification method used to obtain guar-
antees of correctness for models of real life systems that exhibit probabilistic
behaviour. Current verification engines based on sparse matrices, BDDs, and
MTBDDs are fast but scalability is dependent on the structure of the model [15].
In non-probabilistic verification recent SAT/SMT-based engines, such as Craig
interpolation [18] or IC3 [4], complement BDD-based model checking; whilst of-
ten slower, these engines are able to tackle some models where BDDs require too
much memory. This paper presents an algorithm for the analysis of probabilis-
tic safety/reachability properties based on incrementally constructing inductive
invariants, a principle introduced in IC3 [4], and incrementally constructing a
system of linear inequalities.
IC3 is a SAT-based, yet complete, algorithm that computes an over-approxima-
tion of the set of reachable states in the form of an inductive invariant that im-
plies a safety property. One of the challenges in applying inductive invariants to
probabilistic properties is that there is no direct equivalent of this invariant for
probabilistic safety properties, since these are properties that depend on multi-
ple execution paths rather than just reachable states. In other words, a counter-
example for a non-probabilistic safety property is any single path from the initial
state to the unsafe states; a counter-example for a probabilistic safety property
is a group of paths from the initial to the unsafe states with an accrued prob-
ability greater than a specified threshold. Existing work uses SMT techniques
2to produce counter-examples for probabilistic systems as sets of paths [6], or
as minimal critical subsystems [19], but these techniques are based on Bounded
Model Checking(BMC). There are several advantages to using IC3 over BMC [8]:
first it is only necessary to unroll the transition relation one step; second, the in-
cremental construction of invariants allows it to make much more effective use of
incremental SAT solving than BMC; and finally the reasoning in IC3 is localised
and driven by the property being checked. We exploit a by-product of IC3’s in-
variant construction to incrementally build a system of linear inequalities based
on the set of Danger States, defined as the set of states that may eventually
lead to a violation of the safety property (i.e., reach the unsafe state). This is
an over-approximation of the minimal critical subsystem. The system of linear
inequalities represents upper and lower bounds on the probability of violating
the safety property for states in this set. At each iteration of the algorithm, we
check whether these are sufficient to decide the validity of the property.
The technical contributions in this paper are:
– In Section 3 we present an algorithm for verifying reachability properties
in Markov chains, which uses incrementally constructed inductive invariants
to partition the state space and incrementally constructs a system of linear
inequalities bounding the reachability probability. We use SMT techniques
to establish whether the reachability probability falls within the acceptable
range or not. We call our algorithm pIC3, as it is a probabilistic model
checking technique inspired by IC3.
– We prove the soundness and termination of the algorithm in Appendix A.
– In Section 5 we describe the implementation of pIC3, and explore its scal-
ability. We find that the scalability of pIC3 is dependent on the number of
Danger States in the model, and that pIC3 can verify rare-events on models
where PRISM fails.
2 Background
2.1 Discrete Time Markov Chains
The probabilistic transition systems we will consider are given as Discrete Time
Markov Chains (DTMC) [3]. We consider symbolic DTMCs represented as fol-
lows: D = (x, I(x), T (x, x′), P (x, x′)), where
– x = {x0, ..., xn} is a finite set of Boolean state variables. Each complete
assignment of Boolean variables corresponds to a single state, s. We denote
a single state s and its valuation x by s(x): e.g., for x = {x0, x1} and s =
¬x0 ∧ x1, we denote the state by s(01).
– we write x′ to denote the set of next state Boolean variables. Applying prime
to a formula F is the same as applying prime to all of its variables.
– I(x) is a predicate over the state variables, representing the initial states.
We assume only one initial state, but will outline an extension to multiple
initial states in Section 7.
3– T (x, x′) is a transition relation over a set of state variables x, that holds if
there is a transition from x to x′.
– P (x, x′) maps a transition to a probability in [0, 1], e.g., P (x0∧¬x1,¬x0∧x1)
gives the probability of a transition occurring from the state given by x0∧¬x1
to the state given by ¬x0 ∧ x1 3. If x or x
′ are not full assignments, P
maps several transitions to the same probability, allowing symbolic storage
of the transition probabilities. If a state s(x) has any incoming or outgoing
transition, i.e., there exists a satisfying assignment to T ∧ s or T ∧ s′, the
outgoing transition probabilities of the state must sum to 1.
It is not strictly necessary to define both T (x, x′) and P (x, x′), as T (x, x′) eval-
uates to true if P (x, x′) > 0, and to false otherwise. Retaining both is practical
for implementation purposes. We use S to denote the finite state-space, which
is the set of all possible complete valuations of x.
We will describe our method using a small example transition system, il-
lustrated in Figure 2. However, our algorithm is designed to handle transition
systems that are too large to be practically represented explicitly. The example
has two state variables, x1 and x2, and we represent each possible combination
as an explicit state encoded with s(x1x2). The property is φ = ¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 and
the initial states are given by I = ¬x1 ∧ ¬x2.
2.2 Probabilistic safety properties
We consider unbounded horizon safety properties with a probabilistic bound,
e.g., the probability of reaching a failure state must be less than y. Formally, we
write P<y[♦¬φ | I], where y ∈ [0, 1], ¬φ is a predicate over the state variables
that represents the set of failure states, and I is the set of initial states. By abuse
of notation we use P<y[♦¬φ] to denote this property starting from the initial
states.
Property as path probabilities A probabilistic safety property is evaluated
by considering all finite paths that originate in an initial state and finish in a
failure state, and finding the sum of the probabilities for each of those paths oc-
curring. We call these path fragments Danger Paths . The property P<y[♦¬φ|I],
can be written in terms of the sum of probabilities of each of the Danger Paths
occurring.
A Danger Path is defined as a finite path that starts in the initial state, and
eventually leads to a failure state, i.e., it satisfies ♦¬φ,
ωfin |= ♦¬φ ⇐⇒ ∃i ≥ 0. (ω(i) |= ¬φ).
The probability of a finite path of length n, ωnfin occurring, Pr(ω
n
fin), is defined
as:
Pr(ωnfin) = P (ω(0), ω(1)) · ... · P (ω(n− 1), ω(n)).
3 In this work we use P to denote transition probabilities, Pr to denote probabilities
associated to paths, and P(·) for the probabilistic operator in PCTL formulae.
4Now our property can be written in terms of the sum of the path probabilities
for all the Danger Paths : Pr[♦¬φ | I] =
∑
∀ωfin|=♦¬φ
Pr(ωfin). Note that, for
the Danger Paths , ω(0), ..., ω(i− 1) ∈ (Post∗(I) ∩ Pre∗(¬φ)).
2.3 Bounds on path probabilities
We use the notation Up(s) to denote an upper bound for the Pr[♦¬φ | s], i.e.,
an upper bound on the probability of reaching a ¬φ state starting from s. We
use Lp(s) to denote a lower bound for the Pr[♦¬φ | s], i.e, a lower bound on the
probability of reaching a ¬φ state starting from s.
2.4 IC3
IC3 [4] proves or refutes safety properties by incrementally constructing an in-
ductive invariant that implies φ. It does this by building a series of frames, i.e.,
sets of states that over-approximate the states reachable within 0, ..., k steps. IC3
removes states in the frames that can reach ¬φ, known as counterexamples
to induction (CTIs), and proves or disproves their reachability in a backward-
search fashion. It continues this process until it either finds a counterexample
path from the initial states to ¬φ or until it obtains a frame closed under the
transition relation, in which all states satisfy the property. By this technique
IC3 avoids the explicit unrolling of the transition relation that is required by
bounded model checking and explicit reachability analysis.
Conjunctive Normal Form and Frames A formula is in conjunctive normal
form (CNF) if it is a conjunction of clauses, where each clause, c, is a disjunction
of literals. IC3 tightly integrates with a propositional SAT solver, which requires
Boolean formula in CNF.
A frame F is a formula in conjunctive normal form that represents a set of
states in the state space, i.e., Fi ⊆ S, and is a conjunction of multiple clauses.
Induction A frame F is an inductive invariant for a transition system S if
I =⇒ F and F ∧ T =⇒ F ′, i.e, if all initial states are covered by F and F is
closed under the transition relation. A clause c is inductive relative to a frame
F if both I =⇒ c and F ∧ T ∧ c =⇒ c′.
Post and Pre We use the notation Postn(s) for the set of states that are
reachable from s within n steps using transitions in T , and Post∗(s) for the
set of states that are reachable from s using transitions in T . Similarly, we
use the notation Pren(s) for the set of states that can reach s within n steps
using transitions in T , and Pre∗(s) for the set of states that can reach s using
transitions in T [3].
5Paths A path through a DTMC is a sequence of states s0s1s2s3..., starting
from an initial state, such that ∀i. P (si, si+1) > 0, and represents an execution
of the system that the DTMC models. We denote a path by ω, and a finite path
by ωfin , and Paths(s) (Pathsfin(s)) is the set of all infinite (finite) paths in the
DTMC D starting from state s. We use ω(i) to denote the ith state in a path.
3 Our Algorithm (pIC3)
We have noted in Section 2.2 that a probabilistic reachability property can be
expressed in terms of the sum of the path probabilities of all Danger Paths , and
that all Danger Paths are contained within Post∗(I)∩Pre∗(¬φ). PIC3 therefore
incrementally (by introducing and refining successive frames F0, ..., Fn) identifies
three sets of states within the state space, shown in Figure 1:
– ¬φ;
– Safe States, which are states from which ¬φ cannot be reached;
– Danger States, which are states in φ that may reach states in ¬φ. This set
includes, at termination, Post∗(I) ∩ Pre∗(¬φ), i.e., all the Danger Paths .
After the nth frame has been added, Danger States includes Postn(I) ∩
Pren(¬φ), i.e., all the Danger Paths of length n or less.
We begin with a state space specified by state variables, and the states that
violate the property are identified by the boolean formula ¬φ. We symbolically
partition out the Safe States by incrementally constructing inductive invariants,
and we identify Danger States as the states in φ, but not in Safe States. After
each frame is added pIC3 checks whether the system of linear inequalities we
have so far constructed from states found so far in Danger States is sufficient to
prove or refute the property.
To improve efficiency, we store only a partial explicit list of Danger States,
namely only the CTIs explicitly identified by the SAT solver calls, from which
we construct the system of linear inequalities, and we make SMT calls to check
whether the system of linear inequalities contains enough information to prove
or refute the property. We increase the number of states and transitions in
this explicit list and system of linear inequalities until we can prove or refute
the property. Note that, although the SAT solver returns explicit instances of
Danger States and we store this explicit list, we in fact make a generalisation
about each explicit state and remove both the state and a group of similar states
from Safe States . Thus Danger States is composed of two parts: the explicit list,
plus the symbolically handled set φ \ Safe States.
The two key processes of pIC3, that are interleaved, are:
– we partition the state space symbolically, by incrementally constructing in-
ductive invariants;
– we incrementally collect information about the probability of the Danger Paths ,
and the algorithm terminates when we have collected the minimum infor-
mation that is sufficient to prove or refute the given property P>y[♦¬φ].
6In this section we will first give an overview of the partitioning out of the
Safe States, and relate this back to the original IC3 algorithm. Then we will
explain the Danger States collection and system of linear inequalities, and how
it interleaves into the state-space partioning. Finally, we will explain how, after
discovery of new Danger States , we make decisions about the decidability of
the property based on system of linear inequalities constructed so far. A block
diagram of the algorithm is given in Figure 5. The full pseudo-code is found in
Appendix A.
3.1 Partitioning out Safe States
IC3 generates an invariant that implies a property φ by constructing sets of
states, called frames, F0, ..., Fk ⊆ S, that are over-approximations of states
reachable within 0, ..., k steps. It terminates when it finds a path that leads from
the initial state to ¬φ, in which case the property does not hold, or when it
reaches a frame that is closed under the transition relation and does not contain
a state in ¬φ. In this case the property holds, and the frame is an invariant
that implies the property. IC3 builds the frames by starting with the largest
possible over-approximation for a frame, and then uses a SAT solver to find
counterexamples to this as an invariant that implies the property, i.e., states in
the frame that have a transition that leads to ¬φ in one step. For each frame, it
removes any of these states, returned by the SAT solver, by adding clauses that
imply the negation of these states. Each time a new frame is added, any clauses
that are relatively inductive, i.e., hold in both a frame and in the next frame,
are propagated forward to the new frame.
pIC3 defines Safe States as the states that can never reach ¬φ, and attempts
to build an invariant that implies Safe States. This invariant represents an over-
approximation of Post∗(I)∩¬Pre∗(¬φ). We construct the invariant by building
a series of frames F0, ..., Fk ⊆ S, which represent an over-approximation of the
set of states reachable within 0, ..., k steps that can not reach ¬φ within k steps,
formally (Postk(I)\Prek(¬φ)) ⊆ Fk. At the end of the kth iteration of the main
loop, the state space will be partitioned as shown in Figure 1.
We will illustrate our method on the simple explicit 4-state system, shown
in Figure 2. We initialise the frames with F0 = I, as this is exactly the set of
states reachable within 0 steps, and F1 = φ, as this is the biggest approximation
possible of states reachable within 1 step that do not violate φ. Frames are
constructed and modified via two processes: propagation of inductive clauses,
and frame refinement by removal of violating states and generalisations of the
violating states. We will first talk about frame refinement.
Frame refinement Consider that we have added a frame Fk, which is the best
over-approximation we have of the Safe States reachable within k steps. In this
stage of the algorithm, we remove any state s ∈ Fk that can reach ¬φ within one
step via the transition relation T . For each state s ∈ Fk that can reach ¬φ in one
7Postk(I) ∩ ¬Prek(¬φ) ⊆ Safe States
Safe States ⊆ ¬Prek(¬φ)
φ ∩ Prek(¬φ) ⊆ Danger States
φ ∩ (Postk(I) ∩ ¬Prek(¬φ))
¬φ
φ
Fig. 1. Partions of the state space after k steps.
s(00)start s(01) s(10) s(11)
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.5
F1F0
Fig. 2. Initialisation of F0 = ¬x1 ∧ ¬x2 and F1 = ¬x1 ∨ ¬x2.
step, we remove all states t ∈ Fk−1 that can reach s within one step via T , and
for each state t ∈ Fk−1, we remove all states r ∈ Fk−2 that can reach t within
one step via T , and so on. The states we remove are CTIs. By this method, we
can remove all states in Prek(¬φ).
In Figure 3, the SAT solver has returned the one-step transition from s(10)
to s(11) and so we remove state s(10) from frame F1.
We remove the states by adding boolean clauses to the frames that imply
the negation of the state, i.e., to remove state s, we add a clause c =⇒ ¬s.
We could use c = ¬s, but, in fact, we hope to be able to find a sub-clause of ¬s,
which is inductive relative to our frames and will remove a set of s-like states.
We elaborate this step next.
Clause generalisation Consider Figure 4, which shows a fragment of a DTMC
(the states inside frame Fk−2 and the states that have already been removed from
frames are not shown). Suppose the SAT solver returns the state s(100). The
negation of this state, ¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3 is inductive relative to F0, ..., Fk, because
the state has no predecessors. We wish to generalize from this information, and
so we look to see if there are variables in the clause that can be inverted while
the clause remains inductive, and thus can be assigned “don’t care”. Consider
8s(00)start s(01) s(10) s(11)
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.5
F1F0
Fig. 3. Elimination of state s(10) from F1.
¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3. This is not inductive relative to Fk−1 because state s(101)
has a predecessor in frame Fk−1, so we cannot drop variable x3. Now consider
¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3. This is inductive relative to F0, ..., Fk because the state s(110)
has no predecessors. We can hence use the clause c = ¬x1 ∨ x3.
s(110) s(001) s(101) s(100) s(111)
Fk
Fk−1Fk−2
Fig. 4. Example of generalisation procedure on a fragment of a DTMC.
The effectiveness of the generalisation depends on the connectivity of the
state graph and its encoding, and is key to IC3 being able to handle large state
spaces symbolically. The original IC3 algorithm implements a generalisation pro-
cedure that finds a minimal inductive clause [5], and further work improves this
by extracting information from the counterexamples to generalization [12]. We
implement a simple “greedy” generalization scheme for pIC3, where we attempt
to drop each variable of the clause in sequence, and drop the first one that gives
an inductive sub-clause. This approach is sub-optimal, but is nevertheless better
than taking c = ¬s and removing only one state at a time.
Clause propagation When we add the first frame F1, we take the largest
possible over-approximation because we have no additional information. For all
subsequent frames, we have additional information in the form of states we have
removed from previous frames. When we add a frame Fk+1, we start with the
largest over-approximation of Fk+1 = φ, and then we look one by one at the
9clauses in the frames F1, ..., Fk and see whether they can be propagated forward
to the next frames. We propagate relatively inductive clauses, i.e., a clause c in
Fi that holds in Fi+1 will be added to Fi+1. Note that if we have added clauses
in the frame refinement stage that eliminate states that have predecessors and
so potentially are part of Post∗(I), the clauses will fail to propagate to the new
frame, until k is big enough that we have found all the predecessors.
3.2 Building Danger States
In the previous section we have described how by making SAT calls we find
states that are in Pre∗(¬φ). When the SAT solver returns a CTI in the form of
an explicit state and transition to a successor state, we remove the state from
Safe States, as described above, and we add both states to an explicit list of
Danger States. As we find each state we incrementally construct an SMT prob-
lem made up of upper and lower bounds for Pr[♦¬φ | s] ∀s ∈ Danger States with
the information we have about Danger States . These upper and lower bounds are
a system of linear inequalities derived from the partial knowledge of the system
of linear equations that is used to calculate reachability probabilities in existing
probabilistic model checking algorithms [3].
When we find that I is in Pre∗(¬φ), i.e., we have found at least one complete
path in Danger Paths , we check whether we have enough information to prove or
refute the property yet, i.e., whether all solutions to Pr[♦¬φ | I] are guaranteed
to be one side of the probability threshold.
Probability bounds In Section 2.2 we showed that Pr[♦¬φ | I] can be ex-
pressed as path probabilities. We can extend this result to write upper and
lower bounds, Up(s) and Lp(s), for Pr[♦¬φ | s] in terms of path probabilities.
The lower bound can be written as follows:
Lp(s) =
∑
t∈Danger States\¬φ
P (s, t).Lp(t) +
∑
u∈¬φ
P (s, u).
In other words, either ¬φ is reached within one step, i.e., by a transition s to
u ∈ ¬φ, or by a transition to a state t ∈ S \ ¬φ, from which a path to ¬φ is
taken. This corresponds to all path fragments, where all states (except the last
one) are not part of ¬φ [3]. There is a unique solution to Lp(I), because all
states in Danger States are backward reachable from ¬φ, and all states in ¬φ
have Lp(s) = Up(s) = 1.
The sum of the probabilities on transitions leaving any state must equal one,
so we can obtain an upper bound for all s ∈ Danger States. There is a unique
solution to Up(I), because there is a unique solution to Lp(s).
Up(s) = Lp(s) + 1−
∑
∀s′∈S
T (s, s′).
We do not explicitly compute the values for Lp(s) and Up(s), but instead
incrementally construct the SMT problem described above, adding more con-
straints as we find each transition. This allows us to make use of the incremental
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solving capabilities of Z3. Representation of the upper and lower bounds as a
system of linear inequalities allows compact representation of paths that contain
loops, or multiple paths containing the same states and transitions.
Note that the SMT problem includes only transitions we have explicitly found
with SAT calls, and so is incomplete unless we reach final termination.
In Figure 3, the SAT solver has returned the transition from s(10) to s(11).
P (s, s′) gives the transition probability p which in our example is equal to 0.2.
We now know that the lower bound for Pr[♦¬φ | s] is the transition probability
p multiplied by the lower bound for Pr[♦¬φ | s′], i.e., 0.2 · Lp(s(11)). We also
know the upper bound for Pr[♦¬φ | s] is p · Pr[♦¬φ | s′] + (1− p), because the
worst-case scenario is that all remaining, not yet found, transitions from s lead
directly to ¬φ. In our example Up(s(01)) = 0.8 + 0.2 · Up(s(11)).
We make two calls to the SMT solver: the first one checks whether the reach-
ability probability is guaranteed below the threshold y, by adding the assertion
Up(I) < y; the second call checks whether the reachability probability is guar-
anteed above the threshold y, by adding the assertion Lp(I) ≥ y.
If Up(I) < y is not satisfiable then Pr[♦¬φ | I] ≥ y, whereas if Lp(I) ≥ y
is not satisfiable Pr[♦¬φ | I] < y and the property holds. We call both of these
cases “early termination”.
However, if we have found the complete set of Danger States and all transi-
tions between them, then the lower bound will equal the upper bound for every
state: in this case the reachability property is the unique solution to the system
of linear equations. We call this “final termination”.
Detecting loops We use incremental SAT solving to find any not-yet-found
transitions in T between explicitly known states in Danger States, thus finding
any loops in the Danger Paths we have found so far. We may choose the fre-
quency with which to run this search, e.g., every iteration, or only every N th
iteration, or we may omit this step completely and find the loops after we have
found an invariant that implies φ\Pre∗(¬φ). In our experimental evaluation, we
do the latter, as we find it gives marginally quicker run times with the model we
are using.
Adding information from Danger States to the system of linear in-
equalities IC3 terminates when it has produced an invariant that implies φ,
or it has found a counterexample path from I to ¬φ. pIC3 terminates when it
has found enough Danger States to prove or refute the property. It is possible
that pIC3 may find an invariant that implies φ \ Pre∗(¬φ) before this happens.
At this point, we know we have found the full symbolic set of Danger States,
but we may not have added enough information about the transitions within
Danger States to our system of linear inequalities.
In this case, pIC3 uses incremental SAT solving to extract information from
the symbolically represented Danger States, in the form of transitions in T that
we have not yet discovered, and adds the information to the system of linear
inequalities. We do this until we have enough information to terminate.
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If we have added every transition within Danger States to the system of linear
inequalities, we have a full set of linear equations to solve where Up(s) = Lp(s)
for every state. This will give us an exact answer for Pr[♦¬φ | I]. It is, however,
unlikely that we will reach this full set of linear equations without being able to
prove or refute the property at an earlier stage.
Refine frames:
remove Prek(¬φ)
from Fk and add
to DangerStates.
Initialise F0 = I , F1 = φstart
Check proba-
bility bounds: is
P [♦¬φ | I ] < y?
PASS
FAIL
Propagate clauses:
Add new frame
and propagate
clauses forward
Fk = Fk+1?
Detect loops
Search for more ex-
plicit DangerStates
Check probabil-
ity bounds: is
P [♦¬φ | I ] > y?
PASSFAIL
early termination
final terminationDon’t know
New loops
No new loops
Yes
No
yes
N
o
.
k
+
+
Y
es
N
o
Fig. 5. Overview of pIC3.
4 Proof of correctness
4.1 State space partitioning
In Section 3 we have given an overview of how we partition the state space using
an IC3-like technique. We reach this state space partitioning by constructing
regions Safe States in the same manner as the original IC3, and by defining
Danger States to be S \ (¬φ ∪ Safe States). In order to build Safe States, we
incrementally construct an invariant that implies (Post∗(I) ∩ ¬Pre∗(¬φ)), by
building a series of frames F0, ..., Fk, where ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k , (Post
i(I) \Prei(¬φ)) ⊂
Fi. To do this, the following program invariants must hold [4]).
1. I =⇒ F0
2. Fi =⇒ Fi+1 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ k
3. Fi =⇒ φ ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ k
4. Fi ∧ T =⇒ F ′i+1 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ k
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As we remove the states in Pren(¬φ), we add them to Danger States. This
gives us a new program invariant, specific to pIC3. This ensures thatDanger States
only contains states that are part of Danger Paths or that are unreachable
from I.
5. Danger States⊆ Pre∗(¬φ) ∩ φ and Danger States ∩ Fi = ∅
The state space is correctly partitioned when we reach a frame closed under
the transition relation, i.e., Fk = Fk+1. Together, these four invariants and
reaching Fk = Fk+1 guarantee a correct state space partitioning.
4.2 Bounds on reachability probabilities
In Section 3.2, we have given the formula for the upper and lower bounds on the
reachability probabilities for states in Danger States , provided requirements for
“early termination”, and defined “final termination”, which occurs after Fk =
Fk+1. This gives us four more program invariants necessary for a correct result
on termination.
6. Lp ≤ Pr[♦¬φ|s] : ∀s ∈ Danger States
7. Up ≥ Pr[♦¬φ|s] : ∀s ∈ Danger States
8. Lp only ever increases
9. Up only ever decreases
Correctness
Proposition 1. Altogether, program invariants (1) to (9) and termination yield
total correctness of the algorithm. Consequently, we show that our algorithm is
correct by showing that the invariants hold throughout the pseudo-code and that
it terminates. The proof that the invariants hold can be found in Appendix A.
Termination
Lemma 1 Invariant (2), and the fact that k is an index, dictate that the frame
sequence is non-decreasing. Then, due to the check Fk = Fk+1, the sequence
must be strictly increasing until termination. As the transition system is finite,
Fk = Fk+1 must be obtained in finite time.
Lemma 2 Once Fk = Fk+1, we build the full set of linear equations for the
upper and lower bounds in Danger States. There are a finite number of states in
Danger States, and each state has a finite number of transitions. Thus we can
obtain a full set of linear equations in finite time.
Proposition 2. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 and the fact that a set of linear
equations is solvable in polynomial time, it is guaranteed that“final termination”
will occur in finite time.
Note that the algorithm will terminate “early” if the probability bounds show
that Pr[♦¬φ | I] is guaranteed to be on one side of the threshold.
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5 Experimental results and discussion
5.1 Implementation
We implement pIC3 in C++, following the pseudocode in Appendix A. We use
MiniSat 2.2.0 and Z3 4.4.2 for incremental SAT and SMT solving.
We input models directly as clausal transition relations, and do not explore
the challenge of model encoding. Our experiments have shown that the perfor-
mance of pIC3 is highly dependent on the encoding of the model, with a poor
encoding causing models to run as much as 10 times slower. We note that in
order to run PRISM benchmarks it is possible to generate CNF from the BDD
transition relations generated by PRISM, as in [1, 6].
In order to assess the performance of pIC3 over varying model size, we con-
struct a model where we can increase the states without changing the regularity
of the structure of the model (we know that the regularity will affect both the
performance of PRISM and pIC3). This model is an aggregation of multiple
models of Knuth’s dice [14] with the properties that the probability of all, or a
set number, of the dice rolling a number 6 is below a certain threshold. We build
identical models for PRISM and run the same experiments.
We conducted the experimental evaluation on a 12-core 2.40 GHz Intel Xeon
E5-2440 with 96 GB of RAM and Linux OS. We limit experimental run time to
24 hours and use the Linux time command to measure this for pIC3. We compare
to PRISM 4.3.1, running the hybrid engine, and take the verification times for
PRISM from the program output, omitting model construction time.The prop-
erties we use are P<y[F¬φ], and we run experiments on each model for a y for
which the property holds, and a y for which the property does not hold. We pick
y to be within 0.1 of the actual probability of reaching ¬φ. We show the number
of ¬φ states in the table.
Experimental results show that PRISM performs consistently well regardless
of the number of bad states for models up to 109 states, and is equally fast to pass
or fail a property, and generally faster than pIC3. However, pIC3 is faster than
PRISM for large models with smaller numbers of ¬φ states, and can evaluate
some models with 1010 states.
This is because the performance of pIC3 is not dependent on the size of the
model, but the number of CTIs that need to be removed. This is proportional to
the number of Danger States required to prove or refute the property. However,
as the number of ¬φ states and Danger Paths increases, the time taken for pIC3
to prove or refute a property increases well beyond the time PRISM takes. To
improve scalability, we need to reduce the number of CTIs that must be removed.
Generalising to find minimal inductive clauses from CTIs [5] will help this, but
in future work we plan to explore pre-processing steps towards counter-example
minimisation, such as those used in [19].
In summary the experimental results show that, whilst pIC3 is not a fast
choice for small systems where the set of Danger States is a large proportion of
the total state space, it is able to tackle models where PRISM fails, and can be
well-suited to the verification of rare-events.
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states transitions ¬φ states failing property passing property
pIC3 PRISM pIC3 PRISM
371293 2353756 1 0.08s 0.22s 0.92s 0.21s
12 4.96s 0.21s 6.43s 0.21s
144 17.47s 0.22s 1m39s 0.22s
1728 1m3s 0.24s 32m14s 0.25s
4826809 35897772 1 0.7s 2.92s 5.03s 2.94ss
12 11.2s 2.82s 52.2s 2.91s
144 1m46s 2.83s 11m52s 2.94s
1728 165m6s 2.86s 296m43s 2.93s
62748517 24652041644 1 4.2s 39.4s 44.7s 39.0s
12 25.5ss 40.2s 10m32s 34.8s
144 11m58s 40.0s 155m35s 40.5s
1728 TO 38.6s TO 38.5s
815730721 7837799824 1 30.9s 8m24s 7m57s 8m21s
12 5m59s 8m20s 145m31s 8m14s
144 203m31s 8m15s 1293m32s 8m16s
1728 TO 8m9s TO 8m10s
10604499373 113346216612 1 5m47s X 59m44s X
12 31m45s X 1279m10s X
144 1116m5s X TO X
Table 1. Comparison of pIC3 and PRISM. X denotes an out-of-memory error, TO
denotes a run-time exceeding 24 hrs.
6 Related Work
Probabilistic IC3 is based on the IC3 algorithm proposed in [4] which tack-
les finite state non-probabilistic finite state systems. IC3 has been extended to
SMT [13], and applied to infinite state systems [9] using predicate abstraction,
implemented in NuXmv [7]. The IC3 framework has, however, not yet been ex-
tended to probabilistic models, which is the key contribution of this work.
The current standard for probabilistic model checking is PRISM [16]. PRISM
contains four main engines, based on MTBDDs, BDDs, sparse matrices, and
explicit-state methods. The default engine enabled is the hybrid engine, which
uses a combination of symbolic and explicit state data structures. The PRISM
website states that PRISM can handle models of roughly 108 states, depending
on the structure of the model, and the number of distinct probabilities.
SAT-based model checking techniques have been extended to probabilistic
systems. Stochastic SMT (SSMT) was first proposed by [10], who introduced
randomised quantifiers to predicates in SMT. The original paper uses SSMT to
consider bounded reachability in probabilistic automata, which is an incomplete
technique. The approach is, however, more general than that, and can be applied
easily to other properties, and has been integrated with Craig Interpolation [17].
SSMT is a very different approach to pIC3, and builds on the idea of lazy form
of quantifier elimination to compute reachable sets. We have not com
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formance of our approach to SSMT as the available SSMT implementation uses
the bounded model checking (BMC) framework and, as such, is incomplete.
Our work is closely related to work on generation of counter-examples for
Markov chains. The original work in this area [11] applies k-shortest-path al-
gorithms to Markov chains, and then computes a counterexample made up of
the minimum number of paths. This method requires explicit state representa-
tion and so does not scale well to larger systems. Bounded Model Checking has
been used to generate counter-examples for Markov chains [6]. As mentioned
previously, there are several advantages to using IC3 over BMC: IC3 unrolls the
transition relation only one step; it makes much more effective use of incremental
SAT solving than BMC; and the reasoning in IC3 is localised and driven by the
property being checked. The paper mentions obtaining incomplete assignments
from a SAT solver, although it is not clear if they implement this. This is similar
to the generalisation procedure in pIC3. Their method requires computing the
length of the shortest counter-example path using the OBDDs, and so is limited
to models that are small enough for this to be possible.
Similarly, [19] generate counter-examples for Markov chains in the form of
a minimal-critical subsystem. The subsystem can be considered similar to the
Danger States in pIC3, and they also use an SMT solver to solve a system
of linear equations expressing the reachability probability, but they solve the
system for ALL states in the system and introduce boolean variables for each
state to identify the relevant states for the property. pIC3 partitions out the
relevant state-space using IC3-like techniques, and then solves a much smaller
SMT problem. The authors also solve the same problem using Mixed Integer
Linear Programming and introduce optimizations that may benefit pIC3, such
as introducing constraints based on SCCs. Counter example minimisation is
tackled for Markov Chains [2] by abstracting away details of strongly connected
components by replacing with edges that have a probability of walking through
the SCC. It may be possible to apply this method to pIC3 as a pre-processing
step.
7 Conclusions and further work
We have developed and implemented a probabilistic model checking algorithm
for bounded probabilistic reachability properties, based on incremental construc-
tion of inductive invariants and a system of linear inequalities, and shown it is
sound and complete. We have run pIC3 on a series of models of increasing size
and found that pIC3 can verify rare events in systems too large for PRISM to
handle.
In future work we aim to increase the scalability to systems that require
larger numbers of counter-examples to prove or refute properties, by exploring
techniques in [19], and by improving the generalisation of CTIs. Use of incremen-
tal SAT solving in IC3 is still an active area of research, and should be explored
further for pIC3. In addition, like the original IC3, our algorithm is well-suited
to parallel computation [4]
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A Further proofs and pseudo-code
We give pseudocode for our implementation of pIC3, and demonstrate that the
program invariants in Section 4 hold in each part.
main() The top level function of pIC3 is shown in Figure 5. In addition to
initialising the series of frames, pIC3 begins by initialising the upper and lower
probability bounds. We will look at the functions extendFrontier, propagate-
Clauses and checkTermination in more detail, but first consider whether the
program invariants hold after initialisation, at line 8:
– invariant (1) holds due to F0 = I
– invariant (2) and (3) holds as, I =⇒ φ by the check in line 2, and F1 = φ.
– invariant (4) is required to hold from frame F1 onwards.
– invariant (5) holds as Danger States is empty
– invariants (6), (7) hold by the initialisation as 0 and 1
– invariants(8), (9) hold as no changes have been made
extendFrontier() Assume we are in iteration k of the algorithm and frames
F0, ..., Fk satisfy the program invariants (1)-(9). First a new frame Fk+1 = φ is
added, as the largest possible over-approximation of states reachable in k steps
that does not violate φ. Now we need to make the program invariants hold again.
– invariant(1) is not affected
– invariant(3) holds by construction
– invariant (2) will hold in the end, since we will modify frames only by adding
the same clause to all frames F0, .., Fi for some i.
– Preserving invariant(4), Fi ∧ T =⇒ F ′i+1 becomes the crucial part of this
function: if invariant (4) holds, the function returns without taking other
actions. If it does not hold, it must be preserved by removing the state in Fk
that has a transition that leads outside of Fi+1. Thus the removeCTI function
must remove the counterexample to induction (CTI) whilst preserving the
other program invariants.
– program invariants(5)–(9) must be preserved by UpdateProbability.
removeCTI() The occurrence of a CTI s in the frame Fk can have 2 reasons:
– s is reachable from I, and part of a counter-example path
– it is not yet discovered that s is not reachable from I.
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We avoid differentiating between these cases, and remove s from Fk and
add s to Danger States regardless. We pay a slight overhead cost for this of
maintaining an upper and lower bound for P[♦¬φ | s] for unreachable states
that do not contribute to P[♦¬φ | I]. We remove the states with backwards
search.
We build a queue of states to remove, and each entry < q, i > tells us to
remove state q from frame Fi. We first check that we cannot reach q from I,
if we can then we have found a complete counter-example path and we add q
to Danger States and return to the main function. If we cannot, then we add
a clause c =⇒ ¬q to F1, ..., Fj where Fj is the outermost frame where c is
inductive. Adding the clause removes q from each frame. The clause c is an
inductive generalisation of ¬q.
If j ≥ i− 1, we have successfully removed q. If not, we get the predecessor of
q, add that to the queue of states to remove. We also add q to the list of states
to remove, as it may have other predecessors and not be fully removed yet. We
repeat this until the queue is empty.
Now consider the program invariants at the end of removeCTI():
– invariant (1) holds as no changes are made to frame F0
– invariant (2) is not violated as clauses are added to all frames F0...Fi for
some i.
– invariant (3) holds as the formula for the frames are only ever extended, and
thus only ever become stricter.
– invariant (4) is enforced as predecessors are revealed and enqueued to be
deleted and added to Danger States .
– invariant(5) holds as states added to Danger States are found to be predeces-
sors to ¬φ and states are only added to Danger States as they are removed
from the frames.
– for program invariants (6) to (9) we must look at the updateProbability
function.
updateProbability() The updateProbability function incrementally constructs
the upper and lower bounds for P[♦¬φ | s] for all s ∈ Danger States.
– program invariants (1) to (5) are unaffected
– program invariants (6) and (8) are true. We add transitions as we find them
to the upper and lower bounds, building a subset of transitions that all lead
to ¬φ. All states in Danger States are connected to ¬φ by this chain of
transitions, and so there are no bottom strongly connected components, and
the upper and lower bounds have a unique solution. We know the sum of the
transition probabilities of the transitions we have not found yet, and for the
upper bound we assume all these transitions connect to states in ¬φ, so have
a probability mass of 1. For the lower bound we assume all these transitions
connect to states with a probability mass of 0. The check in line 2 ensures
we only add each transition once. We only add to Lp, and so Lp can only
increase.
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– program invariants (7) and (9) are true for the above reasons. We only
subtract from Up.
propagateClauses() When we add a new frame, we propagate forward all
clauses that are inductive from the previous frames. The propagateClauses()
function preserves invariant (4) by line 4. It preserves invariant (2), as clauses are
added that have already been added to predecessor frames. The other program
invariants are unaffected.
checkTermination() The checkTermination() and findLoops() functions en-
sure that, if we reach Fk = Fk+1 without terminating, we have all transitions in
Danger States included in Lp and Up. Once all transitions are found, we have a
full set of linear equations to be solved and a precise answer for Lp(I) = P [♦¬φ].
1: function pIC3
2: if UNSAT(I =⇒ φ) then
3: property is FALSE
4: end if
5: F0 := I, F1 := φ, k := 1
6: ∀s ∈ ¬φ : Lp = 1
7: ∀s ∈ φ : Lp = 0
8: ∀s ∈ φ : Up = 1
9: while true do
10: extendFrontier()
11: propagateClauses()
12: checkTermination()
13: k := k + 1
14: end while
15: end function
1: function extendFrontier
2: Fk+1 := φ
3: while SAT (Fk ∧ T ∧ ¬φ
′) do
4: s:= predecessor of ¬φ extracted from SAT witness
5: s’:= successor of s extracted from SAT witness
6: add (s,s’) to Danger States
7: updateProbability(s,s’)
8: removeCTI(s)
9: end while
10: end function
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1: function removeCTI
2: states = {〈s, k〉}
3: while states not empty do
4: {〈q, i〉} = pop element of states ⊲ the inner-most
5: if SAT (F0 ∧ T ∧ ¬q ∧ q
′) then
6: updateProbabilty(I ,q)
7: Fi := Fi ∧ ¬q ⊲ remove q, not I
8: break
9: end if
10: j:= maximal j for which SAT (Fj ∧ T ∧ ¬q ∧ q
′)
11: c:= inductiveGeneralisation(¬q)
12: for l from 0 to j + 1 do
13: Fl := Fl ∧ c
14: end for
15: if j ≥ i− 1 then
16: break ⊲ have removed state with no reachable predecessors
17: end if
18: w:= witness for SAT (Fj+1 ∧ T ∧ ¬q ∧ q
′)
19: t:= predecessor of q, extracted from w
20: add (t,q) to Danger States
21: updateProbability(t,q);
22: states := states ∪ 〈t, j + 1〉
23: states := states ∪ 〈q, i〉
24: end while
25: end function
1: function updateProbability(s, s′)
2: if T (s, s′) 6∈ Lp(s then ⊲ if we haven’t already found this transition
3: Lp(s) = Lp(s) + T (s, s
′) ∗ Lp(s
′) ⊲ Append transition to Lp
4: Up(s) = Up(s)− T (s, s
′)
5: end if
6: if ¬SAT (Lp(I) < y) then ⊲ SMT solver
7: return FAIL
8: end if
9: if ¬SAT (Up(I) > y) then ⊲ SMT solver
10: return PASS
11: end if
12: end function
1: function propagateClauses
2: for i = 1 to k do
3: for every clause c ∈ Fi do
4: if not SAT (Fi ∧ T ∧ ¬c
′) then
5: Fi+1 = Fi+1 ∧ c
6: end if
7: end for
8: end for
9: end function
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1: function checkTermination
2: if Fi = Fi+1 for some i then
3: findLoops()
4: return TRUE
5: end if
6: end function
1: function findLoops()
2: foundTransitions = (Danger States ,Danger States ′) ⊲ every transition already
found in Danger States
3: while SAT ((Danger States) ∧ T ∧ ¬foundTransitions ∧Danger States ′) do
4: s:=predecessor of Danger States ′ extracted from SAT witness
5: updateProbability(s,s’)
6: add T (s, s′) to foundTransitions
7: end while
8: end function
